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Panentheism has recently become a widely accepted and appreciated concept among 
scholars in the science-theology dialogue, and its theological repercussions have been 
discussed to great extent. Yet, there remains to be studied in more detail the notion of the 
philosophical foundations of the term. A prominent gap in our understanding of these 
foundations is the potential similarity between the metaphysics of Hegel and Whitehead, 
their understanding of the transcendence and immanence of God, and their respective 
versions of panentheism. In this article, I present a critical reflection on the possible 
resemblance between process thought and Hegelian metaphysics and philosophy of God. 
In the last section I refer to those who use panentheism within the science-theology 
dialogue. I try to specify which of the two versions of panentheism, that of Hegel or 
Whitehead, is more popular among those scholars. 
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 That ‘panentheism’ has recently become a widely accepted and appreciated 
concept among scholars who committed themselves to the science/theology debate 
within the Anglo-American context is clear and undeniable. Ian Barbour, Philip Clayton, 
Paul Davies, Arthur Peacocke, and Keith Ward are some key figures supporting the claim 
that it is the concept of the world being ‘in’ God (pan-en-Theos), who at the same time 
surpasses it, that enables us to find a third way between classical theism and pantheism. 
They all use panentheism to depict and explain a new model of divine action and a 
theological understanding of the processes and interactions occurring in the world 
described by natural sciences. 
 Because of its reference to the God-world relationship, panentheism tends to be 
regarded a purely theological concept. But it is not. Its origins are in philosophy and go 
back to Plato and Neoplatonism. Transmitted by Pseudo-Dionysius, John Scotus Eriugena 
and Nicholas of Cusa, panentheism found new expression in German Idealism. It was 
within this philosophical tradition that the very term ‘panentheism’ (Allingottlehre) was 
coined (K.C.F. Krause) and the metaphysical shift from substance to subject found its 
culmination (G.W. Hegel).1 God expressing or unfolding himself in the world is 
understood as the Creator who remains in a dynamic reciprocity with creation. This 
expressivist version of philosophical panentheism became a source of theological 
panentheistic propositions presented in the contemporary science/theology debate.2 
 But there is one more crucial point of reference for many of those who adopt 
philosophical panentheism, namely Whitehead’s philosophy of process. Built within the 
Whitehedian process framework, Charles Hartshorne’s concept of a dipolar God 
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influenced not only John Cobb and David Griffin who applied it to postmodern theology 
and social justice issues. It turned out to be inspiring also for those trying to bridge 
science and religion. Barbour, Clayton and Ward make a clear reference to the philosophy 
of process.3 Although Peacocke distances himself from this tradition, his concept of 
transcendence-in-immanence and his understanding of the God-world relation resemble 
the theology proposed by Hartshorne as well.4 
 After we have named two main philosophical sources of contemporary 
panentheism, the question should be asked whether they are complementary or 
distinctive. Does the Whitehedian dipolar notion of God resemble expressivist Hegelian 
Panentheism? Is there a relation between these two synoptic thinkers in the tradition of 
western philosophy? The case is problematic. There are thinkers, who – following Robert 
Ellis – claim, that we should not treat Whitehead as “a sort of Melchizedek of twentieth-
century philosophy – arriving on the scene to bless Abrahams and slay other warriors – 
without ancestry and obvious philosophical lineage.”5 For them Whithehead’s dependence 
on German and British Idealism is undeniable. On the other hand, however, there are 
scholars who tend to support the opposite position expressed by Victor Lowe who says: 
“Only in his metaphysics – particularly in his doctrine of coherence – is a Hegelian 
influence notable. Had there never been a Hegel, (…) Whitehead would still have been led 
to that [doctrine] by his instinctive acknowledgement that the truth is complex, and that 
different thinkers have got hold of contrasting aspects of it.”6 This position appears to be 
in agreement with Whitehead himself, who said at one point: “I have never been able to 
read Hegel: I initiated my attempt by studying some remarks of his on mathematics which 
struck me as complete nonsense. It was foolish of me, but I am not writing to explain my 
good sense.”7  
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 As one can see, different scholars seem to support opposite positions, which shows 
the need for clarifying the problem. The first part of this article is a critical appraisal of the 
debate on similarities and possible relations between Hegel and Whitehead’s 
philosophical method and metaphysics. In the second part I compare their respective 
versions of panentheism. Finally, in the last chapter, I refer to those who use panentheism 
within the framework of the science/theology dialogue in the Anglo-American context. I 
investigate the question to see which of those two sources of panentheism is more popular 
among those scholars. 
1. Similarities and differences 
 It appears to me that George Lucas is right when he says that comparing Hegel and 
Whitehead one can discover and name a deep difference and division between European 
and Anglo-American philosophy. Those who practice the analytic and critical method in 
the Anglo-American context tend to be in a sharp contrast with advocates of a more 
systematic, synoptic and speculative European tradition.8 However, there is a whole group 
of thinkers (including Lucas) who claim that the Whitehedian metaphysical perspective 
appears Hegelian in many respects. In what follows I examine critically some major 
similarities between the two philosophers in terms of their method and metaphysics. 
1.1. System Builders 
 The first characteristic that can be regarded as a common feature of Hegel’s and 
Whitehead’s philosophy is their attempt to build a philosophical system. They are both 
interested in ‘organic wholeness’. For many contemporary philosophers, such an endeavor 
is a sign of arrogance and boldness. Any pretense of finality and totality is rather 
disregarded at the time when new theories are expected and accepted only within narrow 
and specialist branches of knowledge of any kind. On the other hand, however, such 
holistic attitude in philosophy seems to be more legitimate in the age of science, which – 
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although specialized – still tends to present physical and biological theories that would 
explain the structure of the whole universe and all living organisms on the earth.9 
 Hegel’s metaphysics is rooted in the concept of Idea (Spirit, God) unfolding itself in 
creation, Nature and human beings. For him, totality as a matter of interrelatedness is a 
function of the infinite Spirit. An outline of Hegel’s dialectic proposed by Sprigge helps us 
to realize that the Hegelian metaphysical project is applicable to an understanding of 
history, politics, culture, sociology, psychology, anthropology, epistemology, aesthetics, 
ethics and religion. The explanatory power of Hegelian dialectic is remarkable. Thus 
Hegel himself can be regarded a system builder.10 
 Whitehead’s approach appears to be radically different from Hegel’s, at least at the 
first sight. For one would expect that any notion of finality or totality should rather be 
rejected by any proponent of the philosophy of process, which presupposes a ceaseless 
flux of changes. Indeed, in the preface to Process and Reality Whitehead says: “In 
philosophical discussion, the merest hint of dogmatic certainty as to finality of statement 
is an exhibition of folly.”11 But the truth is that Whitehead’s intentions are by no means as 
humble as he assures us. In the same preface he claims that his purpose is to “state a 
condensed scheme of cosmological ideas, to develop their meaning by confrontation with 
the various topics of experience, and finally to elaborate an adequate cosmology in terms 
of which all particular topics find their interconnections.”12 This statement can be 
regarded as an aspiration to totality. Whitehead’s philosophy is the ‘philosophy of 
organism’. He may not refer to other fields of human knowledge and self-understanding. 
But it is clear that for him all that is and can be known is a part of one organism which is 
in the state of permanent growth and development. This notion permeates the whole 
Process and Reality. 
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That is why I claim that Whitehead’s attempt to construct a cosmological system is 
similar to Hegel’s dialectic project with its wide scope of explanatory power. At this point I 
side with Van der Veken who classifies Whiteheadian speculative philosophy as a more 
humble form of Hegelianism. I also agree with Welker when he says that both 
philosophers are similar to each other in their effort to construct universal “‘contact 
theories’ designed to mediate between heterogeneous realms of cultural experience.”13 
1.2. Metaphysical Principle 
 After this general statement about the systematic character of Hegel and 
Whitehead’s philosophy, we should now turn our reflection to the most crucial question 
in every metaphysics. What is the basic metaphysical principle of the universe? What is 
reality made of? It seems that answering this question Hegel and Whitehead might share 
some common ideas. 
 Trying to understand Hegel’s concept of the organization of reality, one must go 
back to the history of Spinozism. It is inevitable, because Hegel – pursuing another 
attempt to overcome the mind/body (subjective/objective) dualism – proposes an 
idealistic metaphysics of substance, and thus places himself, along with Schelling, among 
the heirs of Spinoza’s idea of One Substance. However, this common starting point would 
eventually bring those two close friends to a profound disagreement. Schelling’s Absolute, 
understood as a unifying principle, seems to be conceived as the indifference of the 
subjective and the objective. Yet Hegel’s idea of the Spirit unfolding itself through the 
dialectical juxtaposition can also bring the unity between the subjective and the objective, 
but it  is possible only through the emphasis on the disparity between the two.14 
 It was at this point that Hegel rejected the static notion of Spinoza’s One 
Substance, replaced it by ‘Subject’, and thus offered a new answer to the question of the 
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metaphysical principle of the universe. The Hegelian Substance (Idea, Spirit, God) is a 
duality of sameness and otherness (subjectivity and objectivity). It is singular and plural 
(universal) at once, and for this reason it is not isolated from individual beings. Reality is 
an expression of the Absolute Spirit which unfolds itself in the perpetual flux of dialectical 
process. The hiatus between One Substance and its modes in Spinoza’s metaphysics is 
overcome. Substantiality is developed into subjectivity.15 
 Similar to Hegel, Whitehead is also aware that his organic doctrine is “close to 
Spinoza; but – as he says – Spinoza bases his philosophy upon the monistic substance, of 
which the actual occasions are inferior modes. The philosophy of organism inverts this 
point of view.”16 Whitehead appreciates Spinoza for beginning with one substance (unlike 
Descartes), but at the same time emphasizes an advance of his own metaphysic in which 
the “’substance-quality’ concept is avoided, (…) morphological description is replaced by 
description of dynamic process, (…) Spinoza’s ‘modes’ now become the sheer actualities.”17 
For Whitehead, reality is a process of becoming of actual entities which he describes as 
basic units, ‘puffs of existence’. They become objectified in other actual entities through 
prehension. Thus relatedness is one of the main characteristics of the philosophy of 
organism.18 
 This analysis shows some important similarities between the two philosophers. 
They perceive reality as a process of becoming and transcend substance into the dynamic 
subject. Lucas rightly points out that for both of them Spinoza’s concept of causa sui 
becomes a useful category in describing the ‘ontological principle’. Hegel’s dialectic, in 
which ‘substance-subject’ releases attributes out of itself, resembles Whitehead’s actual 
entity which “is at once the product of the efficient past, and is also, in Spinoza’s phrase, 
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causa sui.” 19 It means that each actual occasion is a cause of the final stage of its own 
concrescence. 
 On the other hand, however, one should not ignore some major differences 
between Hegel and Whitehead in their reinterpretation of Spinozism, and their shaping 
new metaphysical propositions. Though unfolding dialectically into many entities, the 
Hegelian Subject (Spirit) is one, and his metaphysics can be classified as idealistic 
monism. Contrary to this concept, Whiteheadian actual entities are many. Although they 
remain in the unity of relatedness, Whitehead’s metaphysics is an example of pluralism. It 
can be also classified as another version of atomism, but this time it is an atomism that is 
balanced with continuity. Whitehead explains that the contradiction between the two 
terms is solved in a way similar to the physical description of both the corpuscular and the 
wave nature of light.20 
 The other difference between Hegel and Whitehead refers to finality and 
purposefulness. While Hegel regarded his dialectical unfolding of the Spirit in nature a 
purposive activity heading toward the finality of existing ‘Real’, Whitehead’s process of 
concrescence has neither finality nor purpose other than the enjoyment of each particular 
actual occasion and God (the chief exemplification of actual occasions). 
1.3. Dialectic and Process 
 Foregoing the comparison of Hegel and Whitehead’s understanding of ontological 
principle of the universe remains incomplete and poses another crucial question. It refers 
to the very heart of their metaphysical systems, namely, the mechanics of Hegelian 
dialectics and Whitehedian process. Are they equivalent descriptions of the same 
‘mechanism’? 
 Some experts find a deep resemblance between Hegel’s dialectic and Whitehead’s 
process, and their claims seem to be justified. R. Whittemore says that, although not 
synonymous, both terms are deeply related.21 E. Harris, beginning with the analysis of 
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Whitehead’s process of concrescence within the individual actual entity, extends its 
mechanism to the prehension by the whole generation of actual occasions, and lists its 
phases: dative ingression, conformal physical feeling, conceptual feeling and comparative 
feeling. According to his view, the first two phases merge into one, and the whole 
mechanism resembles the Hegelian dialectical triad: immediacy, distinction and 
differentiation, and articulated synthesis.22 He says that although “Whitehead nowhere 
gives as explicit an account of the method of process as does Hegel, (…) in what he does 
say about it we can recognize most of the important features of dialectic”. The key one 
consists in the fact that “process is one of self-realisation of subjective unity.” 23 
I find Harris’ argument questionable. For the difference between Hegel and 
Whitehead in their understanding of ‘subjective unity’ is considerable. The former 
develops a ‘macro’ ontology of the universal subjective unity (Spirit), whereas the latter 
builds a ‘micro’ ontology made of atoms of subjective unity (actual occasions). The 
Hegelian Spirit posits itself in Nature and Human. Proceeding from unity to plurality, it 
eventually reverts to the unity of the finitely existing ‘Real’. It is questionable that 
Whitehead’s process is based on the same mechanics. One may say that in the process of 
prehension actual occasions pass from unity to plurality just as the Hegelian Spirit. The 
process of concrescence begins with their reference to past actual occasions and lures of 
novelty presented to them in ‘eternal objects’. But this assertion brings to discussion 
another important issue, namely, the role and character of negation in dialectic and 
process. 
It appears that there are three possible definitions of what we could regard an 
equivalent of Hegel’s dialectical antithesis in Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. The 
first one has been already described above. In this view, an actual occasion is a thesis, 
prehension an antithesis, the final stage of concrescence a synthesis. Negation consists of 
an actual occasion’s reference to all past occasions and future possibilities given in eternal 
objects. But does prehension really resemble dialectical negation? The Hegelian antithesis 
is not a random reference to past or future beings. Thesis and antithesis must be somehow 
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related (e.g. a negation of intuition is a sensual representation, instinctive desire is 
opposed to self-conscious recognition). Whitehead’s prehension does not meet this 
requirement (actual occasion can prehend all kinds of data given in past occasions and 
various eternal objects). 
The second possible interpretation of negation in Whitehead’s philosophy is 
problematic for the same reasons. Harris claims that it is not prehension but rather 
‘negative prehension’ that serves as dialectical negation in the process of concrescence of 
an actual occasion. ‘Negative prehension’ is a “definite exclusion of [a certain] item from 
the positive contribution to the subject’s own real internal construction.”24 But again, is 
the excluded ‘item’ related to prehending actual occasion? Or is it chosen randomly?25 
The third attempt to clarify the sense of negativity in Whitehead’s metaphysics was 
presented by Gregory Vlastos, who distinguishes homogenous (logical) and 
heterogeneous dialectic. The former one is found in Hegel for whom all three stages of the 
dialectical triad “are ontologically homogeneous. Thesis, antithesis, and synthesis are all of 
the nature of Idea.”26 Unlike that of Hegel, Whitehead’s dialectic is heterogeneous. Vlastos 
says that in the philosophy of organism thesis is material (physical), whereas antithesis is 
ideal (conceptual). Because of this heterogeneity neither the second dialectical stage can 
be generated from the first, nor the third from the second. Thus in this version of dialectic 
there is no space for an internal contradiction which is essential for homogenous dialectic. 
Vlastos concludes that although it follows that in Whitehead’s system dialectic can no 
longer be used as a heuristic principle, “it does not follow that it cannot be used at all. In 
so far as Whitehead makes use of the concept of internal relatedness, he must conserve a 
certain part of it: the dynamic fusion of polar opposites, the process from the abstract to 
the concrete. This is best shown in his basic metaphysical unit, the actual entity. Without 
the dialectic the actual entity can only appear (…) self-contradictory.”27 This third 
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explanation, presented by Vlastos, is the most convincing one, although the distinction he 
proposes still does not eliminate some important dissimilarities between Hegel’s dialectic 
and Whitehead’s process. 
To sum up, one should have no doubt that there is some basic resemblance 
between the Hegelian dialectic and the Whitehedian process. However, a closer 
examination of this issue shows how many important nuances and differences emerge 
when the mechanics of both systems are compared. For this reason, one should be rather 
cautious in bringing them too easily to a common ground. 
1.4. Whitehead and the British Idealism 
At the end of this critical analysis of possible similarities between the Hegelian and 
Whitehedian metaphysics, I should refer one more time to Whitehead’s own words 
quoted in the introduction. Is it right and useful at all to search for similarities between 
the two philosophers when one of them admits that he has never read the works of the 
other? Is it true that Whitehead did not know Hegel at all? 
It is a fact that Whitehead hardly ever refers to Hegel in his major works. However, 
it has been acknowledged that he was influenced by those who represented Hegel’s 
Absolute Idealism in Great Britain. One of key figures within this tradition – to whom 
Whitehead does refer in Process and Reality – is F. H. Bradley. Though he still sides with 
those who approve the idea of one Subject (Absolute), Bradley certainly makes a step 
toward the philosophy of organism with his emphasis on the primacy of feeling. For him 
reality is one, and it is the Absolute, which dialectically posits itself in appearances: 
“Reality without appearances would be nothing, for there certainly is nothing outside 
appearances.”28 Ellis adds that for Bradley “all things are related, and a concept of true 
reality must include all things which are abstractions if not put in the context of the 
whole.”29 It all naturally resembles Hegel. The originality of Bradley consists of his 
emphasis on the role of experience. The Absolute experiences (feels) the whole. Following 
Metz, Ellis calls Bradley’s Absolutism the ‘Absolutism of experience’, as he refers to the 
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quote from Bradley: “Nothing in the end is real, but what is felt, and for me nothing in the 
end is real but that which I feel.”30 The primacy of feeling will become the crucial point of 
Whitehead’s metaphysics. 
According to Ellis, the trajectory from Hegel, through Bradley to Whitehead has at 
least one more transitory stage, namely Samuel Alexander’s emphasis on the 
inseparability of mind and things experienced.31 Making this observation Alexander goes 
further and suggests that instead of one Mind (the Absolute) we should now think of 
many minds in a democracy of things. It is possible because “Space-Time takes for us the 
place which is called the Absolute in idealistic systems. It is an experimental Absolute. All 
finite being complexes of space-time are incomplete. They are not the sum of reality. But 
their absorption into One does not destroy their relative reality.”32 This plurality of 
subjectivity is interwoven in Point-Instances (spatial points in temporal instants). 
Closeness to Whitehead’s actual occasions is apparent and clear.33 
In the preface to Process and Reality Whitehead says that although he disagrees 
with Bradley on many points, the final outcome of his philosophy does not differ 
significantly from Bradley’s.34 The influence of Alexander on Whitehead (who mentions 
Alexander only twice) seems to be justified as well. If this is true, then we may agree with 
Ellis who says that “even if it looks as though we have come a million miles in coming to 
Whitehead from Hegel, this line of descent at least achieves Hegel’s intent.”35 In other 
words, I think that despite all problems, nuances and incongruences between the 
Hegelian dialectic and the Whitehedian process that I described in this chapter, the claim 
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about Whitehead being influenced by Hegelian metaphysics is legitimate, at least to a 
certain extent.36 
But does this similarity refer to the notion of God and his relation to the world in 
Hegel and Whitehead as well? That is the main point in the second chapter of this article. 
2. Two Versions of Panentheism 
It is not difficult to indicate the main point of difference between classical theism 
(in Aquinas’ exposition in particular) on the one side, and the Hegelian and Whitehedian 
understanding of God on the other. The demarcation line is the concept of God’s 
simplicity, which serves as a ground for all key attributes described in the first part of the 
Summa Theologiae. For God’s supreme perfection, goodness, eternity, immutability, 
omniscience and omnipotence, are all rooted in Aquinas’ basic assertion that God is 
simple, that is free from any metaphysical compositions (form and matter, substance and 
accidents, essence and existence). Thus understood the concept of God’s transcendence 
and independence of the world is complementary in Summa Theologiae with God’s 
immanence, defined as his existence in everything “as an agent is present to that in which 
its action is taking place.” According to Aquinas God is everywhere and “fills all places by 
giving existence to everything occupying those places.”37 
This understanding of God’s nature was challenged by both Hegel and Whitehead. 
Although they want to preserve the dynamics of transcendence and immanence in God, 
nevertheless, they unanimously deny God’s simplicity. The Hegelian Spirit unfolding in 
time and positing itself in Nature and Human Beings resembles the Whitehedian God 
dependent in his consequent nature on non-divine actual occasions. Implicit in their 
philosophy is the idea of God including the world in his being. Thus they embrace – 
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although none of them explicitly – a panentheistic notion of God-world relation.38 
However, there are some important nuances and differences between them which are 
often lost in the application of their metaphysics to theology. We should try to bring them 
into discussion. 
2.1. Hegel as Panentheist 
Trying to present Hegel’s concept of God, we begin usually with the reference to 
his Idea or Spirit which posits itself in Nature and Human Beings. This dialectical process, 
progressively realized in history, is for Hegel a necessary condition of God’s full actuality.39 
It is all true about the Hegelian God and gives us the right to regard him a father of 
contemporary proliferation of different versions of panentheism. However, that is not all 
that Hegel has to say about the God-world relation. There are some important 
characteristics of Hegelian philosophy of God that make his panentheism exceptional in 
comparison with other versions of this position. 
In order to prove that the Spirit is dialectical in its nature, Hegel refers to the 
Christian doctrine of the Trinity, which becomes “the pictorialization of the first person of 
the Hegelian primary triad” in his all-embracing scheme.40 That his understanding of the 
Trinity is far from Christian orthodoxy, however, is unquestionable. McTaggart is right 
when he says that in Hegel “the Holy Ghost is the sole reality of the Trinity. In so far as 
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the Father and the Son are real, they are moments in the nature of the Holy Ghost.”41 
Hegel refuses to acknowledge the precedence of the Father. The life and death of Jesus are 
merely an illustration of the incarnation which is realized not only in Christ, but in all that 
is finite. A fully true divinity for Hegel is the Spirit.42 
Nevertheless, far as he is from orthodox Christianity, Hegel begins his meditation 
on the Trinity with the description of the Kingdom of the Father, which is a 
representation of God as the eternal Idea, a manifestation of God who “is, so to speak, 
outside of or before the creation of the world.”43 This eternal Idea obviously must posit 
itself in creation. Thus God is for Hegel strongly dependent on the existence of some 
world (only weakly dependent on the existence of this particular world).44 What is crucial 
for us, however, is that there is still in Hegel the notion of God in eternity, before creation. 
Consequently, we may say that in Hegel’s metaphysics God is still the Creator of the 
universe.45 
This observation becomes an important argument in the discussion about the 
proper exposition of God’s transcendence and immanence in panentheism. I think that 
Hegel’s denial of God’s simplicity makes it impossible for him to embrace a real 
ontological difference between God and creatures, which is for me the only proper 
expression of God’s transcendence. Nonetheless, the notion of God before the creation is 
an important proof of his otherness in Hegelian philosophy of God. That justifies Leftow’s 
interpretation of Hegel in which he says that Hegelian “idea is in a way common to God, 
and to the world as distinct from God, though only God can perceive this commonality. 
(…) Only divine or absolute experience perceives the fully actual Idea – for only in the 
attaining of such experience is the Idea fully real. Only divine or absolute experience 
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perceives the world as fully one – for the world is fully one only in the existence of 
Absolute Spirit, and this existence is constituted by the having of experiences of the world 
as thus unified.”46 
This line of argumentation can be enriched and complemented by John Cooper’s 
emphasis on the importance of divine freedom in Hegel. In his Philosophy of Right Hegel 
says that freedom is “the absolute end and aim of the world.”47 Although Cooper agrees 
that in Hegelian metaphysics not having a world is not an option for God, he argues that 
Hegel holds a ‘compatibilist’ view of God’s freedom. It is his dialectic that enables Hegel to 
attribute to God both determination and freedom – two sides of the same coin.48 Cooper’s 
assertion can serve as another argument for God’s transcendence in Hegel. It is also 
complementary with Leftow who once again comments on the Hegelian position and says 
that “if the world is for the sake of God, there is a strong though nonformal sense in which 
God’s necessary properties are prior to, determine and render strongly dependent the 
world’s necessary properties, and so its very existence.”49 
To sum up, I claim that Hegel is rightly regarded a founder of contemporary 
panentheism. In his dynamic metaphysics the whole universe is an incarnation of the 
Spirit. Thus Hegel realizes the first part of the basic panentheistic assertion which says 
that the world is in God. In my analysis I tried to explain the way in which Hegelian 
metaphysics also strives to meet the other requirement of panentheism, that is its 
emphasis on God’s otherness from the universe. Nevertheless, I claim that the Hegelian 
concept of God-world relation – although departing significantly from classical theism – is 
still relatively close to the Thomistic understanding of divine causality. As we shall see, 
this position will prove to be somehow different in comparison with the one presented by 
Whitehead. 
2.2. Whitehead as Panentheist 
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Studying the idea of the God-world relation in Hegel and Whitehead, one may 
think that it is exactly at this point that their metaphysical systems get as close as 
possible. For is not the Whitehedian concept of the primordial, consequent and 
superjective nature of God, a clear reference to the Hegelian dialectical triadic nature of 
God? Having this parallel in mind Leftow brings together metaphysical concepts proposed 
by both philosophers and says that “in each new phase of divine experience, God does 
(according to Whitehead) what (according to Hegel) God does over the course of world 
history: unify the concrete world with ‘the nature of God before the world.’ For both Hegel 
and Whitehead, the world becomes one in God’s experiencing it.”50 I find this statement 
questionable and far too optimistic. In what follows I will try to show some unique 
features of the Whitehedian concept of God which make his panentheism exceptional and 
different from the Hegel’s. 
Following his own general rule which says that “God is not to be treated as an 
exception to all metaphysical principles, (…) He is their chief exemplification,” Whitehead 
places God among other actual entities. What distinguishes him is his non-temporal 
nature in which God prehends all eternal objects and does not perish. Thus God becomes 
the Ground of all possibilities in the world. This is the primordial, conceptual nature of 
God in which he has a subjective aim, that is to constitute eternal objects through 
concrescence into relevant lures of feeling (propositions of future novelty for prehending 
actual occasions). Thus understood, God is the “unlimited conceptual realization of the 
absolute wealth of potentiality.”51 However, all these characteristics of the primordial 
nature of God do not make him a transcendent Creator of the universe. According to 
Whitehead “He is not before all creation, but with all creation.” Moreover, in his 
primordial nature God is deficiently actual. Therefore we “must ascribe to him neither 
fullness of feeling, nor consciousness.”52 
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 This lack of perfection in God is fulfilled in his consequent nature which is “the 
physical prehension by God of the actualities of the evolving universe.”53 That is the way 
in which the world is objectified in God who is now fully conscious.54 Thus, in a way 
similar to actual entities, God’s nature is dipolar. But that is not all. Both primordial and 
consequent natures of God are finally sublated to the superjective nature of God which is 
“the character of the pragmatic value of his specific satisfaction qualifying the 
transcendent creativity in the various temporal instances.”55 In order to understand this 
obscure definition one should refer to the concept of ‘creativity’ in Whitehead. God has 
satisfaction from qualifying the creativity. It turns out that creativity is the most basic 
category of the universe, conforming everything, including God. It is “the ultimate 
principle of novelty,56 (…) another rendering of the Aristotelian ‘matter’, and of the 
modern ‘neutral stuff.’ But it is divested of the notion of passive receptivity, either of 
‘form,’ or of external relations.”57 Although creativity is “conditioned by the objective 
immortality of the actual world”, that is conditioned by God in whom all actual entities 
are objectified, “in the philosophy of organism the ultimate is termed ‘creativity’; and God 
is its primordial, non-temporal accident.”58 
All this helps us to understand Whitehedian panentheism in which God seems to 
be devoid of almost all of transcendence. Because actual entities share with God the 
characteristic of self-causation, they can also transcend all other actual entities, including 
God.59 We read in Process and Reality that God is merely “the outcome of creativity, the 
foundation of order, and the goad towards novelty.”60 Since actual entities constructing 
reality have the power of self-actualization (they decide themselves what they prehend), 
God ceases to be the Creator of the universe which itself is everlasting. All he can do is 
propose which eternal objects each actual entity should prehend in the future, and give to 
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it an objective immortality in his consequent nature.61 This Witehedian version of 
panentheism can be summarized with the famous quote from Process and Reality in 
which he says that “God does not create the world, he saves it: or, more accurately, he is 
the poet of the world, with tender patience leading it by his vision of truth, beauty, and 
goodness.”62 
2.3. The Hegelian and the Whitehedian Panentheisms compared 
In the conclusion of this chapter I will now compare the two versions of 
panentheism described above. I will start with the differences, as they are more evident. 
They refer mainly to the crucial issue for panentheism in its dispute with classical theism, 
that is the relation between God’s transcendence and immanence. 
Like all panentheists, both Hegel and Whitehead struggle to defend God’s 
otherness. From what has been said one can see that the Hegelian God is more 
transcendent. He is still the Creator who can be conceived before the existence of the 
world. We also saw that Hegel’s dialectic helps to save God’s freedom. On the contrary, 
the Whitehedian God is less free, as he has to necessarily prehend and objectify in his 
consequent nature all actual occasions. He is not a creator anymore, but rather a part of 
the atomistic system of the universe. There is no creatio ex nihilo. This limitation of God’s 
role in his relation to the world is well-described by Leftow who says: “While in Hegel the 
world is for God and God is for nothing beyond Himself, in Whitehead God and the world 
are for the sake of each other, and both are ‘instruments’ of Creativity.”63 Gregerson goes 
even further and says that “[o]n this point there is hardly a mediation possible between 
Hartshorne and the understanding of divine causality in the Abrahamic tradition, which 
was also presupposed by Hegel. The point of demarcation is whether creativity derives 
from God the creator or belongs to the everlasting world.”64  
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The limitation of God’s transcendence in Whitehead’s philosophy finds another 
expression in the fact that God can only provide the stimulus for actual activities prior to 
their act of prehension, and absorb worldly events after their occurrence. He cannot be 
present simultaneously with actual entities in the act of their concrescence. In other 
words, not only does Whitehead reject creatio ex nihilo, but his understanding of creatio 
continua departs from the one offered in classical theism as well.65 However, I do not want 
to claim that the  Whitehedian God is not transcendent at all. William Christian presents 
a whole set of arguments explaining how God transcends the world in Whitehead. He 
argues that in spite of everything being in process God is free, has his own subjective 
immediacy and is perfect in scope, quality and intensity of his experience.66 I do not agree 
with the first argument he presents, but I concur that there are ways in which it is possible 
to defend God’s transcendence in the philosophy of organism. Nevertheless, one is sure, 
that Whitehead is further away than Hegel from the classical theistic understanding of 
God and his relation to the world, and that his God is less transcendent than that of 
Hegel. 
 But there are also some points of convergence between these two versions of 
panentheism. After all, as we have seen, there are many important similarities and 
influences of Hegelian metaphysics on the Whitehedian philosophy of organism. 
Therefore, if God (the Spirit) and his subjectivity is the basic metaphysical category in 
Hegel, he cannot be neglected and marginalized in Whitehead. In his system each actual 
occasion embodies God and is embodied in God. That obviously resembles the Hegelian 
idea of the Absolute unfolding itself in the world. The three natures of God in the 
philosophy of process are somehow related to Hegel’s dialectic as well. Finally, the 
objectification of the world in God in Whitehead’s thought can be compared with the 
synthesis in God’s dialectic triad in Hegel. God posits himself in the world which is 
eventually sublated to the ultimate ‘Real’. Being a part of this ‘ultimate reality’ gives the 
Hegelian world what Whitehead would call an objective immortality. 
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This comparison of the two versions of panentheism shows how many aspects one 
should take into account when choosing this position as a basis for theological endeavor. 
Here I side with Gregersen when he says that “anyone who wants to describe himself or 
herself as a panentheist should from the outset make clear what kind of panentheism he 
or she is endorsing.”67 That brings us to the last chapter of this article.  
3. Panentheism in the Science-Theology Dialogue 
Knowing the points of convergence and divergence between Hegelian and 
Whitehedian panentheism as described above, I will now try to trace the presence of these 
two philosophical traditions within the framework of the science/theology dialogue in the 
Anglo-American context. I will refer to Barbour, Peacocke, and Clayton. 
3.1. Ian Barbour 
 Focusing his research on the philosophical and theological implications of 
quantum mechanics, the theory of relativity, the big bang theory, evolutionary biology 
and genetics, Ian Barbour criticizes classical theism and accepts the proposition of 
panentheism. Significantly, Barbour does not refer to the Hegelian roots of this concept in 
its contemporary versions. On the other hand, he willingly accepts the Whitehedian 
tradition and uses it to shape his own understanding of the God-world relation. But the 
way Barbour applies process thought in his own research is very specific. His writings 
show that along with the reference to Whitehead himself, Barbour finds a philosophical 
continuation of his thought presented by Hartshorne very important, along with some 
theological interpretations of Whitehead presented by Cobb and Griffin. 
Naturally, Barbour begins with reference to basic concepts of the philosophy of 
organism such as: the primacy of time, the interconnection of events, reality understood 
as organic process, the self-creation of every entity.68 Consequently, in his description of 
God’s nature, Barbour is first rooted in Whitehead’s analysis of the primordial and 
consequent nature of God. But it is the idea of God’s relatedness and his being influenced 
by events taking place in the world, elaborated by Hartshorne, that became the first point 
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of emphasis for Barbour and influenced him the most. For it was in close reference to 
Hartshorne’s Divine Relativity that Barbour said of God in his Religion and Science: “God is 
not merely influenced by the world; God is ‘infinitely sensitive’ and ‘ideally responsive.’ 
Divine love is supremely sympathetic participation in the world of process.”69 Barbour also 
embraces the concept of the dipolar God which again – introduced by Whitehead70 – was 
elaborated by Hartshorne.71 
I think that Barbour, attracted by the idea of divine relativity and the reformulation 
of God’s attributes in Hartshorne, does not pay enough attention to some crucial issues 
challenging the Whitehedian tradition of philosophy of God. Although he mentions the 
problem of God’s transcendence in process thought72, he defends Whitehead and claims 
that the transcendent part of God’s nature is still strongly represented in his philosophy. 
He seems to accept at the same time the idea of God being merely one factor among 
others, and Whitehead’s rejection of creatio ex nihilo.73 That these issues are problematic 
in Whithehead not only in reference to the classical theism but also in comparison with 
other versions of panentheism, I tried to show above. 
I also believe that Barbour is wrong when, in defense of God’s transcendence in 
Whitehead, he claims that ”Whitehead attributes to God the all-decisive role in the 
creation of each new occasion, namely provision of its initial aim.”74 The notion of 
‘creativity’ as the ultimate category in Whitehead and his idea of God being an “outcome 
of creativity”, although primordial and non-temporal – but still merely an ‘accident,’ 
shows that God cannot have a decisive role in the becoming of the world in Whitehead’s 
system.75 I believe that the comparison of the Hegelian and Whitehedian metaphysics 
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sheds a new light on the problem of God’s transcendence in panentheism, and it might be 
helpful in redefining Barbour’s application of Whitehedian panentheism in his 
science/theology discussion. I think it may be possible for Barbour to keep the notion of 
God’s relativity and return to a more traditional (perhaps Hegelian) understanding of 
God’s nature and creativity. This may enable him to better defend the notion of God 
transcendence in his version of panentheism. 
3.2. Arthur Peacocke 
 The method presented by Arthur Peacocke in his writings on theology and science 
raises some important questions. Like other authors in the field, Peacocke shaped his 
theology with respect to the knowledge of the world that is given in natural sciences. 
Being a biochemist, he perceived the world as a complex and dynamic system of countless 
interactions inside and between different levels of organization of matter. He emphasized 
the importance of the emergence of complexity, the role of necessity and chance, and 
both top-down and bottom-up causation. Similar to others he also claimed that this 
notion of the world provided by natural sciences challenges our faith. Thus, he opted for a 
radical reformulation of God’s attributes and the concept of his relation to the world. 76 
What is exceptional about Peacocke’s theology is that in order to reshape our 
concept of God, he embraces panentheism, but at the same time distances himself from 
any philosophical framework for this position. Knowing that his theology is regarded as 
being close to the process tradition of thought, Peacocke claims that panentheism as such 
is “not at all dependent on that particular metaphysical system.”77 At the same time, he 
does not offer any other philosophical point of reference or source for his panentheism. 
I find the position presented by Peacocke highly debatable. In my opinion it is hard 
to ignore the whole philosophical analysis and discussion of God’s transcendence and 
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immanence in the context of the philosophical notion of panentheism. After all, these 
problems are at the very heart of the definition of panentheism and are crucial for its 
application in theology. 
3.3. Philip Clayton 
 The position presented by Philip Clayton is very interesting. As a philosopher he 
knows and elaborates quite well on the whole trajectory in modern thought leading to the 
philosophy of subject and panentheism in German Idealism.78 He also knows the 
Whitehedian philosophy of process and his version of panentheism. It seems that Clayton 
wants to bring these two traditions together, and he does it in a very specific way. 
 Clayton values the long tradition of continental philosophy. That is why, when 
embracing panentheism, he refers first to German Idealism. But surprisingly, it is not 
Hegel that would become for Clayton the main point of reference. In the last chapter of 
The Problem of God in Modern Thought he expresses his commitment to Shelling and his 
idea of a personal God, choosing freely to create and thus self-manifesting himself, having 
history and destiny, growing and developing in time.79 Clayton finds Hegel too close to 
the Aristotelian tradition, especially the idea of the first principle, which conditions all 
entities without being conditioned by them.80 He says that this is a typical position 
accepted by different philosophers of the Absolute, such as Hegel.81 What he disapproves 
of in Hegelian metaphysics is the necessity with which the Absolute has to posit itself in 
creation, a requirement of the system of which the Absolute is an indispensable part. He 
goes on to say that being close to this tradition Hegel “fails to preserve the contingency 
and the mystery of the decision to create.”82 That is why Clayton prefers Schelling’s 
personal notion of God and his focus on freedom.83 Clayton’s distancing himself from the 
Aristotelian tradition is symptomatic and explains the next step he takes. 
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In his search for a notion of God more personal then Hegel’s Absolute, Clayton 
sides not only with Shelling. In God and Contemporary Science he refers to the philosophy 
of organism. I think he does it mainly because of the emphasis on God’s affectivity and 
reciprocity in process thought. This notion matches his stressing the personal character of 
God’s nature.84 He also sides with the process concept of dipolar God which he finds first 
present in Schelling’s idealism.85 However, Clayton mentions the philosophy of organism 
only occasionally and does not address the whole problem of God’s transcendence and 
immanence in Whitehead, of which he must be aware as a philosopher. Nor does he go 
deeper into an analysis of differences between Whitehead and those who further 
developed his thought. These are important shortcomings of his position. Nevertheless, it 
is significant that Clayton, when choosing panentheism, refers to both philosophical 
traditions analyzed in this article. Moreover, his position shows that there are some subtle 
differences and nuances among various versions of panentheism, not only in the 
comparison of dialectical and process thought, but also within German Idealism itself 
(Hegel contra Schelling). 
Conclusion 
The aim of this article was threefold. In the first part I presented a critical analysis 
of possible similarities and differences between Hegel’s metaphysic of dialectic and 
Whitehead’s philosophy of organism. I think that as builders of philosophical systems, 
departing from substance to subject, and emphasizing the dynamic character of reality, 
they both can be regarded as proponents of philosophical concepts that are similar to a 
certain extent. Although the comparison of the mechanism of dialectic and process raises 
some critical questions, it seems possible that the Hegelian metaphysics, transmitted and 
transformed by British Idealists, reached Whitehead and influenced his philosophy of 
organism. I claim that the notion of this trajectory is of a great importance for those who 
accept the philosophy and theology of process. 
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The second part of the article was dedicated to philosophical panentheism in its 
two versions presented by Hegel and Whitehead. I tried to show particular nuances, 
divergences and convergences between these two philosophers. The level at which Hegel 
and Whitehead differ in their departure from the classical Thomistic understanding of 
divine causality and the God-world relation is significant. It has a great influence on the 
understanding of God’s transcendence and immanence in their philosophical systems. I 
think that all this cannot be ignored by those who embrace the panentheistic position as a 
metaphysical background for their theological work. 
The final part of the article, brought to discussion three main authors referring to 
panentheism in the contemporary science/theology debate in the Anglo-American 
context. I found the process version of panentheism to be more popular in these circles. 
Barbour embraces it wholeheartedly. Clayton introduces it as a point of reference in his 
analysis based on Shelling’s metaphysics. Peacocke – although he distances himself from 
Whitehead and his successors – seems to be close to the philosophy of organism as well. 
The notion of Hegel’s panentheism is much less present in the thought of those involved 
in the science/theology dialogue. What I found particularly missing among the 
participants of this debate was a deeper study and analysis of possible similarities and 
dissimilarities between Hegel and Whitehead. This lacuna is especially noticeable 
regarding the problem of God’s transcendence and immanence, which seems to be crucial 
for every panentheist. 
I tried to show in this article that there is an important level of resemblance 
between process and Hegelian metaphysics. I hope that the awareness of this fact will be 
helpful for those who choose panentheism as the philosophical ground for their 
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